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Abstract 
We empirically study the determinants  of the  size  of the  primary and secondary portion in  IPOs. 
Simultaneously, the results provide additional information on the motives for going public.  The data 
show that financing needs underlie the primary portion.  Firms use combined offerings to enhance 
market  liquidity,  whereby  information  gathering  by  institutional  investors  is  stimulated.  Pre-
allocation  and  post-IPO  data  on  market  liquidity  and  seasoned  equity  offerings  support  these 
findings.  Somewhat surprisingly, the diversification motive does  not seem to drive the size of the 
secondary portion; however, secondary offerings show relatively higher control turnover post-IPO. 
JEL classification: G32, G24 
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The source of the shares sold in  an  initial public offering is  an  important but little studied feature. 
Specifically, when primary, i.e., newly created, shares are offered, the IPO selling proceeds accrue to 
the firm.  Conversely, original owners are entitled to the proceeds from selling secondary shares, i.e., 
shares existing before the IPO.  While Jegadeesh et al.  (1993), Spiess and Pettway (1997), and others 
use the nature of the shares that are sold in the IPO  as  an explanatory variable in their research, we 
are not aware of any study that explicitly examines the size of the primary and secondary portion in 
IPOs.  A potential explanation could be that in the U.S., IPOs traditionally include a notable primary 
portion whereas pure secondary offerings are scarcely observed.  In contrast, in Continental Europe 
both primary and secondary offerings have been popular over time, and even offerings that combine 
a primary  and secondary portion  occur regularly.  In  the  sample  of Belgian IPOs  that we  study, 
primary,  secondary and  combined offerings  have been widespread, but the  relative importance  of 
offer type  has  varied over time. l  In this  paper,  we  examine the  determinants  of the  size  of the 
primary  and secondary portion in IPOs,  with  a special  interest in  the  nature of trade-off between 
primary and secondary shares.  Simultaneously, since the deal structure provides information on the 
underlying motives for becoming publicly quoted, our research also contribute.s to  the literature on 
why companies go public. 
Pagano et at.  (1998) consider this question using data on Italian companies.  From comparing 
publicly listed and privately held firms  during  1982-1992, they conclude that the likelihood of an 
IPO is positively related to  the  firm's size and the market-to-book ratio prevailing in the industry. 
Also, they find that the limited new financing raised is used to reduce leverage rather than to finance 
growth.  Furthermore, once introduced on the exchange, IPO firms  show  an  abnormal reduction in 
profitability and a high turnover of the  controlling shareholder(s).  Similar results  are obtained by 
I  In contrast to some other countries in Continental Europe, where reporting and marketing requirements are more 
stringent for IPOs that include primary shares, the Belgian regulation does not distinguish between primary and 
secondary shares. Rydqvist and Hogholm (1995) using Swedish data for the period 1970-1991, and by Goergen (1998) 
using data on  UK and  German  firms  that went public during  1970-1988.  Overall,  these findings 
offer a rather pessimistic view on the role played by European stock exchanges; they suggest that the 
stock market is not used as a mechanism to finance growth, but rather as a way for owners to reduce 
their firm's risk - what Pagano et al.  (1998) have called a rebalancing of financial structure - and to 
cut back on their involvement in the company. 
However, in Continental Europe several changes have taken place since the sample period(s) 
covered by these earlier studies.  Comelli and Goldreich (1999) and Sherman (2000), for instance, 
document the global trend towards using the bookbuilding method for selling shares in IPOs, which 
reduces  asymmetric information problems.  Also,  in the second half of the nineties, new markets, 
such as EASDAQ and the alliance of European growth markets Euro.NM, were set up to meet the 
needs of an increasing number of young and high-growth companies.  Simultaneously, consolidation 
in more traditional sectors enlarged the financing needs of the more established firms.  From these 
observations, it is clear that other motives for going public may have become important. 
Using a sample of 95 Belgian IPOs over the period 1984-2000, we find that younger, smaller 
firms  with substantial  growth  opportunities, high  pre-IPO  investment activity and limited internal 
cash flow generation issue a larger fraction of new shares relative to the number of shares pre-IPO. 
Whereas the overall debt ratio is not significantly related to the primary portion, the fraction of bank 
debt has  a positive impact.  Market conditions,  as  reflected by  the  stock market return  and issue 
activity in  the pre-IPO  year,  do not seem to  affect the size of the primary portion.  Overall, these 
results  indicate that  the  need  for  additional  equity is  the  main force  determining the  size  of the 
primary portion.  In  contrast,  owners  of larger,  highly profitable firms  divest  a larger fraction  of 
existing  shares  at  IPO  time.  The hypothesis  of diversification  driving  the  size  of the  secondary 
portion is not supported.  However, control considerations and avoidance of the cost of underpricing 
are  important determinants  of the secondary  portion.  We  find  some  evidence that  in  secondary 
offerings,  owners try to  exploit windows  of opportunity.  In  addition,  the  evidence  suggests  that 
2 liquidity concerns - which  are important when firms  want to tap the  stock market in the future  -
induce  firms  to  add  a  secondary  portion  to  the  primary  portion  of their  offering  to  achieve  a 
sufficiently large free float.  These firms  also pre-allocate a fraction of the offering to institutional 
investors,  who  typically  help  to  establish  market  liquidity  and reduce  information  asymmetries. 
Overall, while the relative importance of different offering types varies over time, we find that the 
underlying  relations  between  firm  characteristics  and  deal  structure  remain  largely  unchanged. 
Finally,  post-IPO data on  market liquidity, seasoned equity offerings and control  turnover support 
our arguments and findings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as  follows.  Section 2 surveys the main reasons of 
why  companies go public, and the ensuing preference for issuing primary and/or secondary shares. 
Section 3 describes the sample of 95 Belgian IPOs over the period 1984-2000.  Section 4 analyzes 
the determinants of the size of the primary, respectively secondary portion and investigates the pre-
allocation of shares to institutional investors.  Section 5 provides a link between deal structure and 
post-IPO market liquidity, seasoned equity offerings and control turnover.  Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Literature review 
The  theoretical  literature  on  going  public  points  out  various  benefits  of listing.  These  include 
overcoming borrowing constraints (Allen and Gale, 1999), obtaining greater bargaining power vis-a-
vis banks (Rajan,  1992), achieving portfolio diversification (Pagano,  1993; Stoughton and Zechner 
1998; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999), imposing stock market discipline (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993; Stoughton et al.  1999), increasing share liquidity (Arnihud and Mendelson, 1986; Bolton and 
von  Thadden,  1998),  improving  investor  recognition  (Merton,  1987)  and  preparing  a  change  in 
control (Zingales, 1995; Mello and Parsons, 1998). 
Two main motives seem to underlie the above arguments: the desire to obtain external funds 
and the owners' wish to divest from their firm.  For instance, having sufficient investor recognition is 
3 important when firms aim to (further) tap the stock market or when firms are in need of stock market 
discipline because of initial owners' reduced involvement in  the company.  These goals  are likely 
reflected in the way the IPO deal is  structured.  An important aspect of this  design is the size of the 
primary and secondary portion.  This issue is discussed below. 
2.1. Financing needs as a determinant a/the primary portion 
Firms may use the IPO as a vehicle to obtain additional equity.  Especially companies with valuable 
growth prospects are likely to issue a large fraction of new shares at IPO time.  These firms often are 
financially constrained as  entrepreneurs  have limited personal  wealth  or dislike investing more  of 
their own resources in the firm.  Also, in high-growth companies internal cash flow generation may 
be insufficient to finance all available investment opportunities.  Simultaneously, the profile of cash 
flow  generation  may  not  fit  debt  funding.  For these  reasons,  we  expect  measures  of growth 
opportunities to be positively related to the fraction of new shares offered relative to the number of 
shares pre-IPO (primary portion). 
Pagano et al.  (1998) find that firms with high pre-IPO investment activity are more likely to 
go public to rebalance financial structure.  Therefore, we expect historical capital expenditures to be 
positively related to the size of the primary portion.  Conversely, firms that generate substantial cash 
flows internally have a smaller demand for external funds and hence their primary portion is likely to 
be  smaller,  ceteris  paribus.  Highly  levered firms,  on  the  other hand,  may have fully  used  their 
borrowing capacity.  According to Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order theory, these firms will 
then raise equity.  In addition to the debt level, also the composition of the debt may matter.  Rajan 
(1992), for example, shows that firms  whose debt largely consists of bank loans can be held up  by 
their bank.  These firms  may therefore include a larger primary portion in their offering to reduce 
bank bargaining power. 
The above patterns of financing constraints before the IPO are less likely to hold for carve-
outs.  For the parent may have filled the subsidiary's needs or the former's reputation and assets may 
4 have  backed  the  latter's financial  operations.  However,  once  the  carved-out subsidiary becomes 
listed, these links generally are  cut through.  Nevertheless, past financing needs still may have  an 
impact, which suggests the need to control for the fact that a newly listed firm may be a carve-out. 
In  addition to  filling true financing needs, firms  may also try  to capitalize on  the optimistic 
perceptions in the market at IPO time (e.g., De Long et al.,  1990; Ritter,  1991; Rajan and Servaes, 
1997).  During periods of high pre-IPO market returns, firms could increase the size of the primary 
portion.  Also, the clustering of IPOs may induce information spillovers and hence lower information 
problems (e.g. Booth and Chua, 1996; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996; Hoffmann, 2001).  When firms 
try to exploit reduced information asymmetries during periods of high lPO volume, they are likely to 
include a larger primary portion in the offering, ceteris paribus.  Hence, market conditions may not 
only trigger an IPO but also influence the fraction of primary shares placed in public. 
2.2. The desire to divest as a detenninant o/the secondary portion 
Owners may use the  IPO as  a mechanism to divest shares, either to  diversify their portfolio or to 
prepare for a transfer of control.  If so,  one would expect the lPO to include a secondary portion. 
Although selling shares to value enhancing block holders in a private sale rather than an IPO could 
drive up the transaction price, the remaining owners may dislike the monitoring by these new owners 
(e.g., Brennan and Franks, 1997).  Also, Pagano and Roell (1995) argue that large block holders may 
even over-monitor the firm,  which is not the case when selling to more dispersed shareholders in an 
lPO.  Simultaneously, the  liquidity discount applicable to  the  equity of a private company can  be 
avoided when selling secondary shares in an IPO (e.g., Brau et al., 2000). 
If  diversification of owner wealth is an important motive in the decision to go public, owners 
of high-risk firms are likely to divest a sizeable fraction of the shares outstanding pre-lPO (secondary 
portion).  Meulbroek (2000), for  instance,  finds  that in highly volatile Internet-based firms,  many 
owner-managers sell a portion of their shares or even exercise their stock options with the objective 
to sell the acquired shares and diversify their portfolio.  For firms that are relatively younger, with 
5 considerable debt or limited internal cash flow generation, the owners feel the need to diversify to a 
larger extent.  Such owners would therefore prefer to divest a larger fraction of their own shares at 
IPO time, which allows them to immediately reap the diversification benefits.  Conversely, when the 
cost  of IPO underpricing is  relatively  large,  owners may  only  sell  gradually  over time,  thereby 
forgoing immediate diversification benefits (e.g., Gomes, 2000).  Equity holders are likely to worry 
more about underpricing when ownership is highly concentrated and finn size is relatively large. 
Preparing for a turnover in corporate control may be another motivation for selling secondary 
shares at IPO time.  Zingales (1995) points out that going public can maximize the proceeds from a 
later sale of the firm.  By selling off a minority stake to a widely dispersed shareholder base, owners 
may be able to increase the surplus they can extract from the future buyer.  Mello and Parsons (1998) 
similarly argue that an  IPO is a mechanism to implement an  efficient ownership structure since it 
helps to reveal the market's assessment of finn value.  If  the transfer of control - whether immediate 
or remote - is an important motive in the decision to go public, we expect the more established (i.e., 
larger, older) firms  to  go  public  through selling secondary shares.  In these companies, the finn-
specific investment of the initial owners is less essential, which makes divesting existing shares at 
IPO time attractive.  However, it is not a priori clear how this motive affects the size of the secondary 
portion, except that owners may also worry about the cost of underpricing. The latter is likely to be 
most important in a large finn with highly concentrated ownership. 
The literature  suggests  that financial  rather than real  factors  inspire  carve-out  decisions: 
companies carve out their most profitable subsidiaries in industries that trade at high market-to-book 
ratios (e.g., Michaely and Shaw, 1995; Pagano et ai., 1998).  The impact upon the secondary portion 
is not unambiguous, though.  On the one hand,  corporate owners  are likely to .be  less.risk averse. 
Hence, in comparison with initial underpricing, diversification should be  less of a worry.  On the 
other hand, information asymmetries and thus underpricing costs are likely to be smaller for carve-
outs. 
6 Finally,  the  decision  to go  public  may be affected by perceived windows  of opportunity. 
When owners wish to divest, the size of the secondary portion could be positively affected by pre-
IPO stock market returns.  Also,  during periods of reduced information  asymmetries,  the  cost of 
underpricing is lower and, hence, owners may sell more of their own shares at IPO time. 
2.3. The nature of  trade-off  between the primary and secondary portion 
A  closer look  at  IPO  data  reveals  that  these  transactions  are  not  confined  to  pure  primary  and 
secondary offerings.  Pagano et al.  (1998), for instance, find that 11.76% of all IPOs in their sample 
are  combined  offerings  while Spiess  and  Pettway  (1997)  report 48.84%  in their  data  set.  This 
observation begs  the  question  about  the  nature  of trade-off between  the  size of the  primary  and 
secondary portion.  In fact, companies that only issue a primary (secondary) portion have opted for a 
limit case in a continuum whereby the secondary (primary) portion is  set equal to zero.  Below, we 
discuss possible reasons why firms may combine a positive primary and secondary portion. 
When the financing needs of the firm are the main motive for the IPO, we expect the IPO to 
include a primary portion, as discussed previously in section 2.1.  This motivation, however, does not 
need to  exclude  a positive secondary portion.  In  fact,  conditional upon the IPO  being used as  a 
mechanism to raise funds for the firm, there are several reasons why owners may add a secondary 
portion to the primary one.  One reason could be that these owners simply wish to combine raising 
equity with diversification.  Another motive to add a secondary portion could be to improve market 
liquidity  in  order to  attract  institutional  investors  and  reduce  the  cost  of capital.  Institutional 
investors  value  market  liquidity,  as  they  may  have  to  rebalance  their  portfolio  over  time.2 
Simultaneously, institutional investors typically reduce information asymmetries through information 
collection, and thereby also contribute to liquidity (e.g., Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Szewczyk et 
al., 1992; Booth and Chua,  1996; Sherman, 2000; Eckbo and Nodi, 2000).  However, when firms 
2 Also, Maug (1998) shows that market liquidity mitigates the problem that small shareholders can free ride on the 
monitoring efforts of large investors, ~nducing a positive relation between liquidity and the likelihood of monitoring. 
7 sell primary shares to the public to finance their current investment projects, the offering may be too 
small to create a liquid market.  One possible solution is to raise more equity than actually needed 
and build up financial slack.  But when investors thoroughly examine firm decisions, this action may 
be punished by a lower stock price.  Furthermore, models by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) 
stress that the need to regularly tap the stock market imposes discipline on firms and improves stock 
prices.  Therefore, a better solution may be for the firm's owners to divest some of their own shares 
at IPO time.  Particularly, when the size of the secondary portion is relatively small, owners convey 
only  limited  negative  information  concerning  firm  quality  (Leland  and  Pyle,  1977)  or incentive 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  We expect this motive of establishing market liquidity to be 
particularly important when IPO candidates intend to offer seasoned equity in the future. 
On the other hand, when the main motive for the IPO is the need of the owners to divest, we 
expect the  IPO  to include a secondary portion,  as  explained previously in  section  2.2.  However, 
these owners may decide to add a primary portion to the offering to dress up their firm's prospects 
and maximize the offer price.  Teoh et al.  (1998), for instance, find evidence that firms  engage in 
window dressing of their accounts before going public.  Another way in which owners may attempt 
to increase the offer price is to add primary shares.  Specifically, owners may hope that investors will 
interpret the  primary portion  as  a signal  of favorable  growth  prospects.  In  contrast to  the earlier 
discussed motive of creating liquidity, owners are unlikely to prefer the involvement of institutional 
investors  under the latter hypothesis of window  dressing.  For institutional investors collect more 
information and thus are more likely to see through the owners' objectives. 
The above discussion implies that we can add several testable hypotheses to those mentioned 
in  sections  2.1.  and 2.2.  Given the  decision  to  go public,  if the financing needs  of the company 
primarily affect the structuring of the IPO, we expect the size of the primary portion to be chosen to 
fit those financing needs.  Then, a secondary portion may be added only in a second step, either to 
allow owners some diversification or to fit the liquidity needs of the firm's stock.  Specifically, if the 
secondary portion is chosen to  satisfy owner diversification needs,  the size of the primary portion may influence the size of the secondary portion, but the latter may also be set independently.  If, on 
the other hand, realizing stock market liquidity is important, the size of the primary portion is likely 
to  drive  the  size  of the  secondary  one.  Furthennore,  owners  may  take  measures  to  attract 
institutional  investors  and  improve  market  liquidity.  By  contrast,  if the  needs  of the  owners 
dominate the structuring decision, we expect the size of the secondary portion to be chosen first; only 
in a second step a primary portion may be added.  Hence, the size of the secondary portion is likely 
to drive the size of the primary one. 
3. Sample 
Our sample covers the period 1984-2000 and includes all new listings of Belgian finns on the three 
main exchanges of the country, i.e. the main market of the Brussels Stock Exchange (now Euronext 
Brussels), Euro.NM Belgium, and EASDAQ (NASDAQ Europe).3  Our sample does not include unit 
offerings  nor  reverse  LBOs.  For  all  companies,  we  obtained  the  issue  prospectus  and  the 
consolidated financial  statements over the  window two  years before until one,  two or three  years 
after the introduction, depending on the  year of the IPO.  For the post-IPO analysis, we collected 
additional data as indicated in Section 5. 
Figure  1 reveals a concentration of new listings in the periods  1986-1987  and  1996-2000. 
Other studies (e.g., Pagano et al.,  1998; Arosio et ai., 2001) show that in other European countries 
the issue volume is  also peaking during  these time periods.  As expected,  increased IPO  activity 
coincides with periods in which the stock market indices BASI (Euronext) and EASI (EASDAQ) are 
booming.  Also, the relative importance of primary, secondary and combined offerings varies over 
time, with primary and especially combined offerings representing a relatively large fraction of IPOs 
in the later sampling years. 
************** 
Insert Figure 1 
************** 
3 This approach seems justified as firms can choose where to list and as the listing requirements are not very different. 
9 Table 1 shows  the  industry distribution  of the  95  sample firms.4  Similar to  Arosio  et al. 
(2001) for Italy, financial IPOs  are  concentrated in the earlier years of the sampling period, while 
high-tech flotations mainly occurred during the later years.  Despite the creation of new markets, an 
important fraction  of the  high-tech  firms  continued to  opt for  the  main  market  of Euronext.  In 
particular, of the 29 high-tech IPOs since 1996, 14 firms (48.28%) listed on the main market, while 9 
and 6 firms listed on EASDAQ, respectively Euro-NM Belgium. 
************* 
Insert Table 1 
************* 
Table 2 contains some summary statistics on the IPO firms.  Given the length of the sampling 
period and the high inflation rates during the late eighties and early nineties, all absolute statistics are 
corrected for inflation.  The number of new shares offered in the IPO relative to the number of shares 
pre-IPO  (i.e.,  the  primary  portion)  in  the  median  firm  is  10.50%.  The  median  of the  ratio  of 
secondary shares to the number of shares pre-IPO (i.e., the secondary portion) amounts to  15%.  In 
total, the free  float  amounts  to  25.79%  of the shares  outstanding post-IPO.  The average  amount 
collected  as  primary  funds  equals  €31,609,018,  which  is  very  similar to  the  average  amount  of 
secondary funds collected (€31,924,896).  On average, 24.68% of offered shares are pre-allocated to 
institutional  investors,  but  the  dispersion  in  this  variable  is  substantial.  Pre-assigning  became 
increasingly popular during the  second half of the nineties, with the spreading use of bookbuilding. 
Since the beginning of 1996, about 60% of IPOs opted for the bookbuilding procedure; before that 
time,  it was rarely  used.  Median  underpricing, after correcting for the market return,  amounts to 
5.31 %.  This figure  is  rather low  compared to  the underpricing reported for many other countries 
4  As  in Pagano et al.  (1998), holding companies that concentrate 75% of their assets in a single industrial company are 
reclassified as belonging to the corresponding industrial sector.  Financial firms are kept in the sample as in Belgium, and 
many other European countries, these firms represent a relatively important subgroup.  However, as financial firms may 
differ from the other sample firms,  we  have  tested the robustness  of our results by removing them from  the sample. 
These results, which show that our conclusions are unaffected, can be obtained upon request. 
10 (e.g., Ritter, 1991; Leleux, 1993; Arosio et at., 2001), but may reflect the fact that a large majority of 
the sample !POs are firm-commitment offerings (see, e.g., Jegadeesh et at., 1993). 
Firm age at flotation varies between zero and 283 years, with a median of 18 years.  Firm size 
in the year preceding the IPO is also dispersed, independent of whether it is measured by total assets, 
book value of equity, sales  or number of employees.  The median firm  has  a return on  assets  of 
14.52%  and  a  return  on  sales  of  12.06%,  but  profitability  again  differs  widely  across  firms. 
Companies are highly levered: on average, 67.16% of total assets are debt-financed, and bank loans 
represent 42.53% of total debt.  Despite high leverage, an  average coverage ratio of 22.05 seems to 
indicate that firms can easily meet debt obligations.  The median coverage ratio, however, is much 
lower (3.09); and some firms have a leverage ratio above one andlor a negative coverage ratio.  So, it 
can be concluded that not all firms are financially sound at !PO time.  The average market-to-book 
ratio, calculated using the offer price, is 3.94.  In  the median firm, capital expenditures in the year 
before the offering amount to 49.99% of property, plant and equipment, demonstrating considerable 
pre-!PO investment activity.  The growth rate in total assets and sales in the year before the offering 
shows a similar picture: the median firm experiences a 28.22% increase in total assets and a 21.43% 
growth in sales.  This trend continues during the first post-IPO year as sales grow by 18.68%. 
Ownership before and after the !PO is highly concentrated.  On average, there are 2.46 block 
holders, i.e. owners who hold at least 5% of shares; together, they own 93.31 % of the firm's shares 
before the IPO.  Afterwards, their number and stake are reduced to  1.99, respectively 64.94%.  In 
only 16% of the cases, initial ownership decreases below 50 percent, but this does not need to imply 
that initial block holders lose control once listed.  Similar results have been found for Italy (pagano et 
al., 1998), Germany (Ljungqvist, 1997; Goergen, 1998) and other European countries. 
************* 
Insert Table 2 
************* 
Table 3 presents separate summary statistics by IPO type (primary, secondary or combined 
offering).  Reporting separate statistics for combined offerings may give a first indication of whether 
11 these IPOs resemble primary or secondary offerings.  Table 4 shows the p-value corresponding to a 
non-parametric  Wilcoxon rank sum test  of difference in  distribution  across  pairwise  subsamples. 
The  tables show  that 24 of the IPOs  are  primary whereas  34 are  secondary offerings  and 37  are 
combined.  The size of the primary and secondary portion is significantly different for every offering 
category.  Interestingly, combined offerings have both a smaller primary and secondary portion.  The 
amount  of primary  and  secondary  funds  collected  also  differs  across  categories,  except  for  the 
amount  of primary  funds  collected  by  primary  and  combined  offerings.  Next,  although  the 
percentage of shares placed in public is similar, the total amount of funds  collected is significantly 
higher for  combined offerings.  Especially  as  compared to  secondary offerings,  primary  offering 
firms  are younger,  smaller and higher levered, but they do  not differ significantly from combined 
offerings with respect to age, size (except when measured in sales) and leverage.  Also, primary IPOs 
generate  significantly  less  cash  flow  (ROA,  ROS)  when  compared  to  secondary  and  combined 
offerings  and  have  significantly  worse  coverage  ratios.  Furthermore,  combined  offerings  have 
internal callh flow  generation and coverage ratios similar to  those of secondary offerings.  Finally, 
primary  and  combined  offerings  do  not  have  significantly  different  growth  prospects;  those  of 
secondary offerings  are  significantly lower,  especially when  considering the  market-to-book ratio 
and the growth rate of total assets one year before the IPO. 
******************* 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 
******************* 
4. Determinants of the flotation structure 
In  this  section,  we first  try to  identify variables  that explain the  size of the  primary,  respectively 
secondary portion in IPOs.  Then, a two equations system is set up to determine the nature of trade-
off between both variables.  Finally, we investigate the role of institutional investors in a model that 
explains the likelihood of involving institutional investors through pre-allocating shares.  To limit the 
12 influence  of  outliers,  all  variables  are  winsorized  at  5-95%.  Also,  we  have  checked  for 
multicollinearity by regressing each explanatory variable on all the others. 
4.1. Determinants o/the size o/the primary, respectively secondary portion 
Table 5 presents the results - parameter estimates and p-values - from OLS regressions that explain 
the size of the primary, respectively secondary portion of the offering.  In the first column of each 
Panel, we report unconditional regression results (i.e., for the total sample), and in the second column 
we present results that explain the size of the primary,  respectively secondary portion conditional 
upon the offering having such a portion.  The latter results, therefore,  should help to  separate the 
likelihood and size aspects of the IPO structuring decision. 
We start by discussing the results in Panel A, which explains the size of the primary portion. 
As proxies for the demand for external equity, the following historical variables are used: the market-
to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities; the lagged level of capital expenditures relative to 
property, plant and equipment as a proxy for the recent use of financial resources; EBITD/total assets 
as a measure of internal cash flow  generation; leverage, measured as debt to total assets.  The debt 
mix is calculated as bank loans to total debt.  To control for the fact that older and larger companies 
generate more  stable cash flows  and can absorb higher leverage, firm  age  and company size  are 
included.  Firm age is the logarithm of the firm's age at IPO time, whereas firm size is the log of total 
assets.  In addition, we include a dummy variable that equals one when the IPO concerns a carve-out 
and zero otherwise; in our sample, 20 IPOs are carve-outs.  Market conditions are measured by the 
stock market return (BASI) in the year preceding the IPO and the number of IPOs in that year scaled 
by the sample size.  Finally, we include industry dummy variables using the classification by Ritter 
(1991); the parameter estimates corresponding to these dummy variables are not reported. 
The hypothesis that companies with a larger need for external equity include a larger primary 
portion is confirmed in the total and conditional sample.  Growth opportunities and historical capital 
expenditures  are  significantly positively related to the  size of the  primary portion.  These results 
13 suggest  that  finns  with  attractive  investment prospects  and  high  pre-IPO  investment activity  go 
public because they require additional equity.  Conversely, internal cash flow generation significantly 
lowers the primary portion, in  line with the  pecking order argument of Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Leverage does not significantly influence the size of the primary portion, but for a given  level of 
leverage, finns whose debt largely consists of bank loans issue a larger fraction of new shares.  This 
result is  supportive for the arguments of Rajan (1992).  When finns worry about bank infonnation 
monopolies, they may tap other financing sources, such as equity, to reduce bank bargaining power. 
Older  companies  issue  a  significantly  lower  fraction  of  new  shares  at  IPO  time,  but 
conditional upon raising at least some new equity, this variable is no longer statistically significant. 
A potential explanation for this observation is that, as shown by the univariate statistics, primary and 
combined offerings include the  youngest sample finns, implying too little variation in this variable 
for finns with a primary portion.  Next, firm size is significantly negatively related to the size of the 
primary portion.  As expected, larger firms raise a smaller fraction of new equity.  Finally, the carve-
out dummy variable is not significantly related to the primary portion. 
Neither the stock market return nor IPO volume in the year preceding the IPO does influence 
the size of the primary portion.5  These results, however,  do not provide conclusive evidence that 
firms are not trying to benefit from windows of opportunity: when market returns or IPO clustering 
are  high,  finns  may still collect a larger amount of new  equity through  a higher offer  price in a 
buoyant market.  Lowry and Schwert (2001),  for instance,  find that price updates during the IPO 
5 The significantly negative relation between historical IPO volume and the primary portion in the subsample of firms 
that offer primary shares results  from  combined offerings  being  amply represented in  the  later years of the sampling 
period, when IPO volume is relatively high.  Note that Tables 3 and 4 show that combined offerings have a significantly 
smaller primary portion.  When a dummy variable that equals one when the IPO is a combined offering is included in the 
conditional regression model of Table 5, Panel A, the variable historical IPO volume is no longer significant whereas the 
other results are  unaffected.  The dummy variable itself is not  significant; this result indicates  that differences  in the 
primary  portion  of primary and  combined  offerings  are  not  determined  by  factors  other  than  the  variables  already 
included in the model.  These results are not reported, but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
14 registration period are positively related to market movements during this period.  However, when 
using the log of primary funds collected as the dependent variable, the historical stock market return 
and preceding IPO volume are not significant either (not reported).  Our results, therefore, do not 
support the idea that firms  try to exploit windows of opportunity when raising new equity at IPO 
time.  A  similar conclusion is reached by Eckbo and Nodi (2000), who no longer find evidence of 
IPO underperformance following hot issue periods once firms are matched on size as well as market-
to-book ratio. 
Panel B presents the results on the determinants of the size of the secondary portion.  In this 
model, the variables growth opportunities and capital expenditures are not included as  they merely 
refer to the firm's investment opportunities.6  Internal cash flow generation and leverage, however, 
are kept in the model as these variables may be related to the firm's risk and, thus, the owners' wish 
to diversify.  The other variables of Panel A  are also retained.  In addition, we include ownership 
concentration and the interaction between  o~nership concentration and firm size to control for the 
fact that owners may worry about the cost of underpricing, as argued in Section 2. 
Owners of firms  that generate  substantial cash  flows  internally  sell  a  significantly larger 
fraction  of existing  shares  at  the  IPO,  a  result  that  holds  across  both  samples.?  This  finding 
contradicts the diversification hypothesis.  In contrast, the positive relation between firm size and the 
6 We have re-estimated this model after including the market-to-book ratio and pre-IPO capital expenditures, but find that 
these variables are not significant.  These results are not reported, but can be obtained from the authors.  To save on 
degrees of  freedom, what is valuable in the simultaneous equations model, and for comparability reasons, these variables 
are left out in Table 5, Panel B. 
7 When owners time the IPO by selling more shares when cash flows are unexpectedly high or even dress up their firm's 
financial statements before going public (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998), the same positive relation might be observed.  To test 
this  argument, the  variable  internal cash flow  generation  is  split  up  into  an  expected  part,  which  is  based upon the 
historical value of EBITD/total assets, and an unexpected or potentially manipulated part.  We find that only the expected 
part of internal cash flow generation is significant, which rejects this timing or manipulation hypothesis.  These results 
are not reported, but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
15 secondary portion may either support (cut back on firm exposure) or reject (larger finns are  more 
stable, ceteris paribus) this hypothesis.  Next, the variables leverage and firm age are not significant, 
which  again  does  not support the diversification  motive.  These  results,  therefore,  suggest  that 
diversification is not the main consideration driving the size of the secondary portion.  In line with 
our findings, Pagano et al.  (1998),  Goergen (1998), and others report supportive evidence for the 
idea  that  European  IPOs  are  mainly  used  to  reorganize  ownership  structure.  In  larger,  cash 
generating firms, the firm-specific investment of initial owners is less essential, which might provide 
an impetus to rearrange ownership.8 
The carve-out dummy variable is significantly positive,  which  supports  the  argument  that 
carve-outs are subject to smaller information asymmetries and therefore can divest a larger fraction 
of existing shares at IPO time.  Ownership concentration is significantly positively related to the size 
of the  secondary  portion,  but  only  in  the  overall  sample.  This  result  indicates  that  a  highly 
concentrated  ownership  structure  mainly  induces  owners  to  include  a  secondary  portion. 
Interestingly, we find evidence suggesting that owners worry about underpricing when selling their 
shares  as  the interaction tenn between ownership concentration  and firm  size has  a significantly 
negative coefficient.  This finding supports the arguments of Gomes (2000), Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001), among others.  When underpricing imposes considerable costs, owners may try to maximize 
their overall proceeds from divesting shares by limiting the number of shares sold at the IPO itself; 
8 As the nature of ownership might influence our conclusions, we have also re-estimated the model using the subsample 
of firms where a venture capitalist is involved in the ownership structure (25 firms), respectively the subsample of firms 
where no such investor owns shares.  Our conclusion that the diversification motive does not drive the size of the 
secondary portion holds in both subsarnples.  This result is not surprising since the venture capitalist's equity stake at IPO 
time is relatively small.  Also, when comparing firm and IPO characteristics, we find no significant differences between 
both subsarnples, except that ownership concentration is lower in the subsample of  firms that involve a venture capitalist. 
A further observation is that venture capital-backed IPOs are more likely to occur following periods of hot issue activity, 
which is also well documented in the literature. 
16 afterwards,  as  more  information  becomes  publicly  available,  they  may  continue  to  sell  shares 
gradually. 
Market conditions, as reflected by the stock market return and IPO clustering in the pre-IPO 
year, do not seem to influence the size of the secondary portion.  However, when using the log of the 
amount of secondary funds  collected rather than the percentage of shares offered as  the dependent 
variable  (not reported), the  historical stock market return is  significantly positively related to  the 
amount owners cash in from selling their shares, suggesting some window of opportunity effect after 
all.  Interestingly,  this result  is driven  by the  secondary offerings,  which  suggests that especially 
owners who merely wish to divest shares try to exploit windows of opportunity at IPO time. 
************* 
Insert Table 5 
************* 
4.2. The trade-off  between the primary and secondary portion: a simultaneous equations model 
Section 2 considered several hypotheses concerning the nature of trade-off between the primary and 
secondary portion in IPOs.  One possible explanation assumes that firms raising equity may add a 
secondary portion to the offering to achieve diversification of owner wealth.  A second explanation 
presumes that a secondary portion is added to increase market liquidity.  A last hypothesis is that 
owners wishing to divest add a primary portion to falsely signal growth opportunities and increase 
the offer price.  To take the potential simultaneity of the IPO structuring decision into account, we 
present the results from a simultaneous equations model in Table 6.  Given the explanatory variables 
used in Table 5, the model is identified. 
The results from the equation explaining the primary portion in Table 6 are in line with those 
of  Table 5, Panel A.  Even the findings concerning the secondary portion are largely comparable.  Of 
special interest however is the fact that the size of the primary portion is not affected by the size of 
the secondary portion while the reverse holds for the secondary portion.  In particular, the size of the 
primary portion significantly negatively affects the size of the secondary portion, which indicates that 
17 when the primary portion of the offering is already large, owners divest only a small fraction of their 
own shares.  As such, these results do not support the false signaling nor the diversification 
hypothesis.  For if false signaling would underlie combined offerings, the secondary portion should 
drive the primary one.  Furthermore, similarly to Table 5 panel B, Table 6 lends no support to the 
diversification hypothesis.  In fact, Tables 3 and 4 showed that firms launching a combined offering 
are quite similar to primary offering firms.  Both categories of firms do not differ in terms of risk 
profile, except that combined offerings generate higher internal cash flows.  Hence, if anything, 
owners in combined offering IPOs are subject to lower risk and, thus, are less in need of 
diversification. 
Overall, Tables 5 and 6 both show that the portion of new equity raised in the IPO is 
determined by the needs of the firm.  In particular, growth opportunities and pre-IPO investment 
activity positively affect the size of the primary portion.  Combined offerings, however, generate 
more internal cash flows and, thus, their need for additional equity at IPO time could be smaller 
when compared to primary offerings.  The negative relation between internal cash flow generation 
and the primary portion supports this conjecture.  However, the amount of primary funds collected is 
not significantly different across these offering categories, as shown in Table 4.  Together, these 
findings suggest that - given that primary and combined offerings have similar size and growth 
prospects - combined offerings can establish a higher offer price, which would be due to their higher 
pre-IPO profitability.  Then, a smaller fraction of new shares needs to be issued to raise a given 
amount of primary funds.  As internal cash flow generation is not significantly related to the log of 
primary funds collected (not reported), the latter argument is supported by the data.  Consequently, 
these firms have the opportunity to add a secondary portion while keeping the percentage of shares 
placed in public comparable to that of primary and secondary offerings.  As discussed above, the data 
do not support the hypothesis that diversification is an important determinant of the secondary 
portion.  Alternatively, a larger free float has a positive impact upon market liquidity.  Hence if the 
latter is a concern, adding a secondary portion could be beneficial.  In fact the evidence in subsequent 
18 sections lends direct support to this hypothesis.  Meanwhile, to check the robustness of our 
conclusions, the model in Table 6 has been re-estimated on the subsample of firms that do sell 
primary shares at IPO time.  We find that our results continue to hold, implying that in the subs ample 
of combined offerings, the secondary portion is not driven by diversification concerns. 
Finally, the introduction section mentioned that changes occurred in the !PO market during 
the sampling period.  To distinguish between changes in the values of the independent variables, that 
reflect changes  in the characteristics of the  firms  going public,  versus  changes  in  the  underlying 
structure  of  the  IPO  market,  we  checked  for  structural  breaks.  Specifically,  we  allowed  the 
coefficient of each variable in Table 6 to show a break at the beginning of 1996.9  In a first model, 
which consumes more degrees of freedom, all variables are allowed to change at once, whereas in a 
second model, the coefficient of each variable - one by one - could differ before and as  of 1996. 
Using  a Chow  test,  the  hypotheses  of identical  parameter estimates could not  be  rejected in the 
equation explaining the primary portion.  However, in the secondary portion equation, some of the 
parameter estimates turned out to be significantly different across both subperiods.  After including 
year dummy variables, these differences disappeared without affecting the significance of the other 
explanatory variables.  These results indicate that the relations between firm characteristics and the 
primary,  respectively  secondary  portion  have  remained  stable  over  time,  although  institutional 
features (e.g., bookbuilding) and the mixture of firms engaging in an !PO have changed.  Section 3, 
for instance, showed that most financial companies in the sample listed in the earlier years while the 
high-tech offerings mainly have taken place in  the later years.  As  a last check, the simultaneous 
regression model of Table 6 has been re-estimated using only the subsample of !POs that listed in the 
second half of the nineties.  The earlier conclusions prove to be robust. 
************* 
Insert Table 6 
************* 
9 Using 1995  as  the dividing year results in the same classification, whereas using 1997 leads  to  fewer differences in 
parameter estimates.  The results of these robustness checks are not reported, but can be obtained from the authors. 
19 4.3. Institutional share allocation and deal structure 
We  now  further  investigate  the  hypothesis  that  securing  market  liquidity  is  an  important 
consideration for  firms  that use  the stock market to  obtain additional  funding.  In  Section 2,  we 
argued  that  such  firms  would  benefit  most  from  institutional  interest  through  a  reduction  in 
information asymmetries and an increase in liquidity.  Eckbo and Norli (2000) indeed find empirical 
support for the idea that liquidity reduces the cost of capital of !PO firms.  Hence, if market liquidity 
is  an  issue  for  firms  using the  exchange  as  a source of financing,  we  expect these firms  to  pre-
allocate a fraction of the offered shares to institutional investors.  Simultaneously, for institutional 
investors to be interested in the offering, it should be possible that a sufficiently deep market in the 
firm's shares can develop.  Therefore, by placing a larger amount of equity in public (i.e., increasing 
the free float), firms may be able to attract institutional investors' interest. 
We examine the role of institutional investors using a logit regression model.  This model 
explains  the  likelihood  of pre-allocating  shares  to  institutional  investors  at  !PO time.  Table  7 
presents the results.  In column one, the full sample is used and the model includes a dummy variable 
that equals one when the offering contains a primary portion.  In column two, the model is estimated 
using the subsample of firms  with a primary portion.  To test for differences between primary and 
combined offerings, we include a dummy variable that equals one for combined offerings.  To take 
into account that the amount of funds placed in public is endogenously determined, the log of total 
funds collected is instrumented on the variables that determine the size of the primary and secondary 
portion. 
Table 7 shows that firms floating off a larger amount of funds at IPO time are more likely to 
pre-allocate  shares  to  institutional  investors,  ceteris  paribus.  This  result  seems  to  confirm  the 
hypothesis that firms  using the  stock exchange to obtain funding may  add a  secondary portion to 
their  offering  to  increase  free  float  and  attract  professional  investors,  who  in turn can  help  to 
establish market liquidity and reduce the cost of capital.  The negative sign of the variable firm age, 
which becomes significant in column two,  suggests that firms  that are less  likely to tap  the  stock 
20 market in the future benefit less from institutional interest and may even dislike the monitoring from 
these professionals (e.g., Brennan  and Franks,  1997).  On  the other hand, the preceding finding  is 
also  consistent  with  the  argument that older firms  exhibit  smaller information  asymmetries  and 
therefore  are less  in need of institutional investors.  However,  the positive sign  of historical lPO 
volume, which can be considered as  a proxy for periods of reduced information asymmetries, does 
not confirm this  asymmetric information argument.  Finally, firms that do  raise new  equity at lPO 
time are significantly more likely to pre-allocate shares.  Column two shows that once controlled for 
the underlying differences between primary and combined offerings, both offering categories are as 
likely to pre-allocate shares to  institutional investors.  Together, our results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms using the stock exchange as a source of financing find it advantageous to pre-
allocate shares to institutional investors.  Simultaneously, a larger free float,  which ensures that a 
liquid market can develop, increases institutional investors' interest in the offering.  The evidence on 
reissuing activity post-IPO in the next section lends additional support to the preceding conjectures. 
As  pre-allocation to institutional investors - together with bookbuilding - mainly became a 
practice  in  the  second half of the nineties,  the models in  Table 7 have been re-estimated on  the 
subs ample  of IPOs  during  that  period  to  check  robustness.  The  conclusions  of Table  7  are 
unaffected. 
5. Post-IPO characteristics 
************* 
Insert Table 7 
************* 
In  this  section,  we investigate whether post-IPO  data confirm preceding arguments  and findings. 
Specifically, we examine market liquidity, seasoned equity offerings and control turnover following 
the  lPO.  A major problem we encountered is  that for many firms in the  sample  we  do  not have 
information that extends a long period beyond the IPO.  For an examination of market liquidity, the 
problem is limited though.  Listings with a history shorter than one, respectively two years are simply 
21 disregarded, depending upon the  horizon under consideration.  In line with the literature, we use a 
window  of three,  respectively  five  years  to  analyze  seasoned  equity  offerings  and  takeovers. 
Therefore, we especially consider our findings with respect to takeovers as preliminary evidence. 
5.1. Market liquidity 
To test the argument that firms  that (regularly) need extra external financing once listed,  structure 
their IPO to secure a sufficiently deep market in their stock,  we collected data on post-IPO market 
liquidity.  The latter is defined as the number of shares traded during a horizon of one, respectively 
two years starting one month after the IPO divided by the number of shares outstanding after the IPO 
(see also Eckbo and Nodi, 2000).  The first post-IPO month is disregarded to correct for the fact that 
early liquidity may be affected by the adopted distribution rules. 
To  determine  whether the  presence  of institutional  investors  influences  post-IPO  market 
liquidity, we construct  a dummy  variable that equals  one  when a fraction  of the  offering is  pre-
allocated to  such  investors.  Total funds  collected, measured  as  the log  of the  number of shares 
placed in public times the offer price, is also added to test whether deal size affects post-IPO market 
liquidity.  To control for firm age and size, the log of firm age at the IPO, respectively the log of total 
assets post-IPO are included.  As in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), Chordia et al.  (2001) and 
others,  we  control  for  additional  factors  that  may  impact  on  market  liquidity:  investment 
opportunities,  a  dummy  that equals  one  when  the  firm  lists  on a  market  for  innovative growth 
companies (i.e., EASDAQ or Euro.NM Belgium), a dummy that equals one when at least one market 
maker is  appointed,  the  historical  stock market return  and  our measure  for  hot  versus  cold issue 
markets.  Again, we include industry dummy variables using Ritter's (1991) classification.  Table 8 
contains the results. 
Pre-allocating  shares  to  institutional  investors  significantly  improves  post-IPO  market 
liquidity,  independent  of the  time  horizon  considered.  This  finding  confirms  that  institutional 
investors  help  to  establish  market  liquidity.  Furthermore,  total  funds  collected  is  significantly 
22 positively related  to  post-IPO  market  liquidity,  holding constant firm  size.  The positive  sign  is 
consistent with the idea that firms may complement a relatively small primary issue with a secondary 
portion to secure a sufficient free float and hence liquidity.  However, firms that are larger in terms of 
total assets show lower share turnover rates during the one-year window, ceteris paribus. 
Next, we find evidence of different levels of market liquidity depending upon the exchange 
on  which the firm lists.  Hence,  as  pointed out by Corwin and Harris (2001), the selection of the 
appropriate stock market is  an  important consideration for IPO  candidates.  Appointing  a market 
maker also significantly increases market liquidity, especially over longer horizons.  The latter result 
is  not surprising as  the task of a market maker mainly consists  of guaranteeing market  liquidity. 
Historical stock market performance affects market liquidity positively.  Also, there is some evidence 
of reduced liquidity following periods of high IPO volume (during the two-year window).  Finally, a 
comparison of the adjusted R2 of the models in Table 8 indicates that it is easier to explain market 
liquidity over the longer horizon.  The reason may be that the trade of shares in the first post-IPO 
year still is subject to some random factors, for instance distribution rules or support activities by the 
investment banker. 
5.2. Seasoned equity offerings 
************* 
Insert Table 8 
************* 
In  this  section,  we  investigate what firms  use the stock exchange to  raise additional  equity once 
listed.  Given that the latest IPOs in our sample could only be followed during a limited post-listing 
period,  this  analysis  might  be subject to  biases  if we  miss  seasoned equity offerings  outside the 
observation window.  However, Spiess and Pettway (1997) find that the firms in their sample quickly 
return to the public equity market once listed: on average, this occurs after 1.3 years (median of 1.2 
years).  Following Jegadeesh et al.  (1993), Levis (1995), and Spiess and Pettway (1997), we use a 
23 three-year  horizon  to  investigate  the  likelihood  of a  seasoned  equity  offering post-lPO.  In  our 
sample, 31 firms raise additional equity within this three-year horizon. 
In Table 9, we present the results from a multivariate logit model based on Garfinkel (1993) and 
Jegadeesh  et  al.  (1993).  The  variables  included  are  the  market-to-book  ratio,  historical  capital 
expenditures, internal cash flow generation, leverage post-lPO, firm age, firm size post-lPO, the log of 
primary  funds  collected,  unexplained  underpricing,10  the  percentage  adjustment  in  the  offer price 
relative  to  the  mid-price  of the  initial  price  range,  the  cumulative  return  on  the  firm's  equity, 
respectively the stock market, both measured in the year following the IPO,l1  and the industry dummy 
variables.  In line with Table 7, the model is first estimated using the full sample and includes a dummy 
variable that equals one when the offering contains a primary portion (column one).  Thereafter, the 
model is estimated using the offerings with a positive primary portion and includes a dummy variable 
that equals one for combined offerings (column two). 
The results in Table 9 show that leverage post-IPO is positively related to the likelihood of a 
seasoned equity offering, but only significantly so in the overall sample.  Hence, consistent with the 
pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984), firms  with a relatively high post-IPO debt 
ratio are more likely to subsequently tap the stock market.  Firms raising more equity at lPO time are 
significantly less likely to return to the equity market during the window under study, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly, older firms are less likely to reissue equity following their lPO. 
10 Unexplained underpricing is the residual of the regression of underpricing on the adjustment in the offer price, growth 
opportunities, firm age, firm size, a dummy variable that equals one if a high-reputation foreign investment bank is part 
of the  underwriting  committee,  and the  historical  stock  market  return  and  IPO  volume  (see  Garfinkel,  1993).  All 
variables have the expected sign and are significant at the 10% level, except for firm age and size.  The adjusted R2 of the 
regression amounts to 23.20%.  These results can be obtained upon request. 
11  If  IPO firms reissue before the first year had passed, the firm and stock market return are calculated until the day before 
the announcement of the seasoned offering and  transformed to  a one-year basis.  A similar procedure  is  adopted by 
Garfinkel (1993). 
24 Next,  the  coefficient  of the  firm's  cumulative  return  on  equity  post-IPO  is  significantly 
positive.  This relation is also documented by Garfinkel (1993), Spiess and Pettway (1997), among 
others.  It may support the argument that when their stock is undervalued, firms wait to reissue until 
the  share price increases  to  reflect its  fair value.  However,  it is  also  consistent with  the market 
feedback hypothesis, which states that after a price run-up firms adjust upward their marginal return 
estimates and reissue equity to finance  additional projects  (e.g., Jegadeesh et al.,  1993;  Garfinkel, 
1993). 
Finally,  firms  that  include a primary portion at  their IPO  are  significantly more  likely to 
reissue equity.  Thereby primary and combined offerings are as likely to raise new equity within the 
three-year post-IPO window. 
5.3. Transfer of  control 
************** 
Insert Table 9 
************** 
Finally, we investigate which IPO firms  are taken over subsequent to listing.  For this purpose, we 
study takeovers  during  a period of five  years  following  the  IPO.  In view  of the length of this 
window, the results from this section should be considered as preliminary.  Within the horizon under 
study 12 sample firms are taken over. 
Following Palepu (1986), we set up a multivariate logit model to explain the likelihood of an 
IPO firm being taken over within five  years following its initial listing.  The variables included are 
the market-to-book ratio, internal cash flow  generation, leverage post-IPO, firm age, firm size post-
IPO, and the cumulative return on the firm's equity, respectively the stock market, both measured in 
the year following the IPO.  To this model, we add a dummy variable that equals one when the IPO 
is a secondary offering.  The results are presented in Table 10. 
Only a few variables are significant at the 10% critical level.  Firms with a higher debt ratio 
post-IPO are significantly less likely to be taken over, which is consistent with the literature.  Also, 
firms  with  a higher return  on  equity  post-IPO  are  less  likely  to  be  taken  over,  ceteris  paribus. 
25 Finally, the coefficient of the secondary offering dummy variable is significantly positive.  In section 
2.2., we argued that the firm-specific investment of owners in these firms may be relatively small as 
compared to primary and combined offerings.  As a result, secondary offerings can be expected to be 
easier takeover candidates. 
6. Conclusions 
************** 
Insert Table 10 
************** 
This paper empirically investigates the determinants of the size of the primary and secondary portion 
in  IPOs,  using  a  sample  of  Belgian  IPOs.  The  data  show  that  firm  characteristics  differ 
systematically according to structure choice, not only at IPO time, but also during various post-IPO 
windows.  The main  conclusion  is  that  the  choice  of deal  structure  reveals  information  on the 
underlying motives for going public. 
Firml!  launching a primary or combined offering have similar motives:  they wish  to  obtain 
additional equity to finance available investment opportunities and reduce bank bargaining power. 
Also,  these  are  the firms  that plan  to reissue  new  shares  later on.  Firms  selling primary  shares 
typically are the younger and smaller ones in the sample; they show high growth and often have a 
need to rebalance financial structure.  To improve the conditions under which seasoned equity can be 
raised  in the  aftermarket,  the  data  show  that  already  at  IPO  time  these  firms  try  to  decrease 
information  asymmetries  and  improve  liquidity.  Pre-assigning  a  fraction  of  the  offering  to 
institutional investors tums out to be helpful for this purpose.  The evidence also indicates that firms, 
if possible, complement their primary portion with a secondary one to increase the free float.  Post-
IPO data lend further support to these findings:  the shares of firms that include a primary portion 
have higher liquidity.  Also,  the  free  float has  a positive impact upon  market liquidity post-IPO. 
Finally, we find no evidence that these firms try to exploit windows of opportunity. 
26 Next, owners of larger, highly profitable firms divest a larger fraction of their own shares at 
the IPO.  The results show that risk diversification is not a major underlying motive for including a 
secondary portion in the offering.  Conversely, the size of the secondary portion reveals that owners 
are concerned about the cost of underpricing.  In addition, we find some evidence that in secondary 
offerings owners try to exploit windows of opportunity by  selling a larger fraction of their shares 
when the historical stock market retum is high.  The data also show that secondary offering IPOs are 
significantly less  worried about  establishing  market liquidity  and have  little interest in  attracting 
institutional investors.  Finally, there is some evidence of higher ex-post control turnover within the 
group of secondary offerings. 
Overall, this paper shows that firms have different motives for going public and that in 
evaluating IPOs, both at the time of the event and during the years afterwards, it  is important to take 
these differences into account.  As we demonstrate, the choice of deal structure proves to be 
particularly informative for this purpose. 
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33 Table 1: Industry distribution of sample finns 
NACE  Sector  Number of firms 
16  Production and distribution of electricity, gas, steam and hot water  1 firm 
22  Production and preliminary processing of metals  1 firm 
24  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products  3 firms 
25  Chemical industry  4 firms 
31  Manufacture  of  metal  articles  (except  for  mechanical,  electrical  and  instrument  I firm 
engineering and vehicles) 
32  Mechanical engineering  1 firm 
34  Electrical engineering  7 firms 
41142  Food, drink and tobacco industry  9 firms 
43  Textile industry  2 firms 
45  Footwear and clothing industry  2 firms 
46  Timber and wooden furniture industry  1 firm 
47  Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and publishing  3 firms 
48  Processing of rubber and plastics  3 firms 
61  Wholesale distribution (except dealing in scrap and waste materials)  5 firms 
64/65  Retail distribution  2 firms 
66  Hotels and catering  3 firms 
75  Air transport  I firm 
79  Communication  I firm 
81  Banking and finance  14 firms 
82  Insurance, except for compulsory social insurance  3 firms 
83  Activities auxiliary to banking and finance and insurance; business services  20 firms 
84  Renting, leasing and hiring of movables  1 firm 
85  Letting of real estate by the owner  2 firms 
97  Recreational services and other cultural services  5 firms 
TOTAL  95 FIRMS 
34 Table 2: summary statistics for the total sample of N = 95 !POs. 
Primary (secondary) portion is the ratio of new (existing) shares sold to the public relative to shares outstanding before the 
IPO.  Percentage of shares placed is measured as new and existing shares sold at the IPO relative to shares outstanding after 
the IPO.  Primary (secondary) funds collected is the number of primary (secondary) shares times the offer price.  Total funds 
collected is the sum of primary and secondary funds collected.  Institutional stake is the percentage of shares sold that is pre-
allocated  to  institutional  investors.  Underpricing  is  initial  stock  return  minus  the  corresponding  market  return.  The 
variables  measuring firm  characteristics  are  self contained.  Number of block holders before  the  IPO is  the  number of 
shareholders whose  ownership exceeds  5%.  Number of block holders  after the  IPO  equals  the number of initial block 
holders that retain an ownership percentage above 5% after the IPO.  Ownership concentration measures the percentage of 
shares that initial block holders hold before, respectively after the IPO. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
IPO TRANSACTION 
Primary portion  0.3004  0.1050  0.7790  o  6.7568 
Secondary portion  0.1704  0.1500  0.1658  o 
Percentage of shares placed  0.3080  0.2579  0.1629  0.0587  0.8711 
Primary funds collected (€)  31,609,018  5,048,711  209,060,000  o  2,041,785,900 
Secondary funds collected (€)  31,924,896  8,113,853  124,150,000  o  1,095,864,000 
Total funds collected (€)  63,533,914  16,657,104  239,640,000  86,486  2,041,785,900 
Institutional stake  0.2468  o  0.3089  o  0.9133 
Underpricing  0.1395  0.0531  0.3429  -0.2153  2.7769 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Age  39.4421  18  53.2401  o  283 
Total assets (€)  1,348,613,382  44,407,221  9,575,200,000  422,260  92,360,483,771 
Book value of equity (€)  106,708,008  11,548,860  306,170,000  -2,597,647  1,783,888,453 
Sales (€)  281,596,118  44,588,670  919,420,000  o  6,194,926,469 
Number of employees  1345.84  401  4276.96  33044 
ROA (EBITD/total assets)  0.1235  0.1452  0.2103  -0.7205  1.1063 
ROS (EBITD/sales)  -0.0079  0.1206  0.6423  -3.5983 
Taxes/total assets  0.0318  0.0159  0.0565  -0.0001  0.4537 
Leverage (debt/total assets)  0.6716  0.7256  0.3421  0.0319  2.8262 
Bank debt/total debt  0.4253  0.4186  0.2923  o 
Interest coverage  22.0540  3.0875  78.4790  -31.8377  461.3582 
Market-to-book ratio  3.9366  1.8992  0.7403  4.8245  17.9444 
Capital expenditureslPPE  0.9411  0.4999  1.5824  -0.5189  9.0636 
Assets growth 1 year before IPO  0.5330  0.2822  0.7407  -0.1541  3.5668 
Sales growth 1 year before IPO  5.1747  0.2143  36.2668  -0.7128  336.4444 
Sales growth 1 year after IPO  0.6087  0.1868  1.3065  -0.7634  9.0503 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Numb. block holders before IPO  2.46  2  1.4718  7 
Numb. block holders after IPO  1.99  2  1.1439  5 
Ownership conc. before IPO  93.31  98.61  11.3780  33.43  100.00 
Ownership conc. after IPO  64.94  69.10  15.9887  11.85  94.13 
35 Table 3: summary statistics for primary, secondary and combined offerings - mean and median 
Primary (secondary) portion is the ratio of new (existing) shares sold to the public relative to shares outstanding before the 
lPO.  Percentage of shares placed is measured as new and existing shares sold at the lPO relative to shares outstanding after 
the lPO.  Primary (secondary) funds collected is the number of primary (secondary) shares times the offer price.  Total funds 
collected is the sum of  primary and secondary funds collected.  Institutional stake is the percentage of  shares sold that is pre-
allocated to  institutional  investors.  Underpricing is initial  stock return  minus  the  corresponding market  return.  The 
variables measuring fIrm  characteristics are self contained.  Number of block holders before the IPO is  the number of 
shareholders  whose ownership exceeds 5%.  Number of block holders  after the IPO equals the number of initial block 
holders that retain an ownership percentage above 5% after the lPO.  Ownership concentration measures the percentage of 
shares that initial block holders hold before, respectively after the IPO. 
Variable  Primary offerings (N =  24)  Secondary offerings (N =  34)  Combined offerings (N =  37) 
IPO TRANSACTION 
Primary portion  0.8714  0  0.2061 
n~Rln  n  n  1~'\4. 
Secondary portion  0  0.2798  0.1805 
Il  02'\00  o  14!lQ 
Percentage of shares placed  0.3437  0.2798  0.3109 
n?m.7  n?.'\oo  n~lli~ 
Primary fimds collected (€)  102,692,614  0  14,546,865 
] 1 nli,\  ~IR  n  10 R71i  1?~ 
Secondary funds collected (€)  0  73,030,637  14,859,965 
n  11  77~ QR4.  8 Rn2 4.R? 
Total funds collected (€)  102,692,614  73,030,637  29,406,830 
lln6,\~IR  11 17~  QR4.  ?~  Ii'\~  6~4. 
Institutional stake  0.2548  0.1034  0.3734 
n  n  n '\nno 
Underpricing  0.0743  0.0634  0.2518 
n n,\~l  nO~7B  n OR4.R 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Age  37.1250  49.4412  31.7568 
In  ~7  12 
Total assets (€)  339,150,279  3,385,768,557  104,069,047 
?n S'\O 4.0"  7Q ?'\n;'R  ~? IQO RR3 
Book value of equity (€)  80,260,671  217,943,996  20,964,959 
4.1i711i,\4.  ~4.Q71 Q4.4.  R "'.117? 
Sales (€)  258,294,590  511,561,488  84,761,322 
Qi!111i2?  IiR  R'\'\  '\Q2  4.1  ~ln  23? 
Number of employees  2036.90  1872.03  545.65 
1?R  1i7A.  211l 
ROA (EBITD/total assets)  -0.0201  0.1486  0.1857 
nm/i'\  n 1'\'\7.  n I'\Q4. 
ROS (EBITD/sales)  -0.2832  0.0856  0.0626 
OO'\?.'\  nnRQ  nl102 
Taxes/total assets  0.0102  0.0306  0.0463 
0004.7  n[J]8~  Q 0221 
Leverage (debt/total assets)  0.7711  0.5541  0.7177 
!17"R  n '\QQQ  o  7181i 
Bank debt/total debt  0.4623  0.4022  0.4235 
n4.210  o  ~Rl0  n4.4.7n 
Interest coverage  19.6128  23.0920  22.6690 
I '\S7Q  ~ 7QliQ  3'\,RR 
Market-to-book ratio  5.1406  1.4433  5.4794 
7.11 Rl  117'\1  ? Q7.1R 
Capital expendituresIPPE  1.0370  0.6495  1.1675 
n ",4.7  Qun4.  nIi7.~n 
Assets growth I year before IPO  0.7319  0.2394  0.7114 
n~Q~1  n IIl71  n.1101 
Sales growth I year before IPO  4.8023  0.1642  9.8247 
n?7.7.Q  n ln4.n  n  ~lil? 
Sales growth 1 year after IPO  1.1088  0.3234  0.6062 
n~~7.Q  n  lOR~  n~llA. 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Numb. block holders before IPO  2.75  1.9706  2.7297 
?  ?  ~ 
Numb. block holders after IPO  2.2083  1.7059  2.1081 
7.  1  7. 
Ownership conc. before IPO  92.25  94.33  93.07 
QR  7.R  Illl  R~  Q711 
Ownership cone. after IPO  58.98  69.71  64.43 
1i4.0R  7nnn  1i~4.~ 
36 Table 4: univariate comparisons of summary statistics 
(p-value corresponding to a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test) 
Primary (secondary) portion is the ratio of new (existing) shares sold to the public relative to shares outstanding before the 
lPO.  Percentage of shares placed is measured as new and existing shares sold at the lPO relative to shares outstanding after 
the IPO.  Primary (secondary) funds collected is the number of primary (secondary) shares times the offer price.  Total funds 
collected is the sum of primary and secondary funds collected.  Institutional stake is the percentage of shares sold that is pre-
allocated  to  institutional  investors.  Underpricing  is  initial  stock  return  minus  the  corresponding  market  return.  The 
variables  measuring firm  characteristics  are self contained.  Number of block holders  before the  IPO is  the  number of 
shareholders  whose ownership  exceeds  5%.  Number of block holders  after the lPO equals the  number of initial block 
holders that retain an ownership percentage above 5% after the lPO.  Ownership concentration measures the percentage of 
shares that initial block holders hold before, respectively after the lPO. 
Variable  Primary - Secondary  Primary - Combined  Combined - Secondary 
IPO TRANSACTION 
Primary portion  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
Secondary portion  0.0001  0.0001  0.0014 
Percentage of shares placed  0.2974  0.9294  0.1518 
Primary funds collected (€)  0.0001  0.7453  0.0001 
Secondary funds collected (€)  0.0001  0.0001  0.0560 
Total funds collected (€)  0.2974  0.0230  0.0822 
Institutional stake  0.0741  0.1662  0.0002 
Underpricing  0.9120  0.1321  0.1708 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Age  0.0371  0.4827  0.0057 
Total assets (€)  0.0017  0.2327  0.0030 
Book value of equity (€)  0.0001  0.2770  0.0001 
Sales (€)  0.0036  0.0249  0.0531 
Number of employees  0.0095  0.3984  0.0012 
ROA (EBlTD/total assets)  0.0016  0.0001  0.5267 
ROS (EBlTD/sales)  0.0689  0.0552  0.9266 
Taxes/total assets  0.0021  0.0102  0.8230 
Leverage (debt/total assets)  0.0790  0.6428  0.0062 
Bank debt/total debt  0.6197  0.8911  0.7126 
Interest coverage  0.0012  0.0247  0.3257 
Market-to-book ratio  0.0001  0.4701  0.0001 
Capital expenditureslPPE  0.9834  0.2450  0.1781 
Assets growth 1 year before lPO  0.0112  0.9036  0.0050 
Sales growth I year before lPO  0.3441  0.2028  0.0013 
Sales growth I year after lPO  0.3278  0.5494  0.0023 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Numb. block holders before lPO  0.0555  0.9578  0.0175 
Numb. block holders after lPO  0.1209  0.8103  0.1468 
Ownership conc. before IPO  0.2457  1.0000  0.2134 
Ownership cone. after lPO  0.0659  0.4694  0.1391 
37 Table 5: OLS regression results: detenninants of the size of the primary, respectively secondary 
portion 
The dependent variable in Panel A (B),  i.e.  primary (secondary) portion, is the ratio of new (existing) shares sold to the 
public  relative to  shares  outstanding before  the  lPO.  Growth  opportunities  are measured by the  market-to-book  ratio. 
Capital expenditures is  the  ratio of capital expenditures prior to  the lPO relative to  property, plant and  equipment.  To 
measure internal cash flow generation, EBITD/total assets is used.  Leverage is debt to total assets.  Debt mix is the ratio of 
bank loans to total debt.  Firm age (size) is measured by the logarithm of firm age (total assets) at the lPO.  The carve-out 
dummy is set to one when the offering is a carve-out and zero otherwise.  Historical market return is the stock market return 
(BASI) in the year preceding the IPO, whereas historical lPO volume is the number of IPOs in the preceding year scaled by 
the total number of offerings in the sample.  Ownership concentration measures the percentage of shares that initial block 
holders own before the lPO. 
PANEL A.- DETERMINANTS OF THE SIZE OF THE PRIMARY PORTION 
TOTAL SAMPLE  OFFERINGS WITH A PRIMARY 
PORTION 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept  2.6774  0.0076  4.2630  0.0070 
Growth opportunities  0.0393  0.0094  0.0320  0.0979 
Capital expenditures  0.1720  0.0364  0.2653  0.0385 
Internal cash flow generation  -1.4703  0.0001  -1.4775  0.0044 
Leverage  -0.1761  0.4118  -0.2722  0.3900 
Debt mix  0.5746  0.0145  1.0485  0.0092 
Firm age  -0.1239  0.0264  -0.0682  0.4664 
Firm size  -0.0922  0.0372  -0.1628  0.0245 
Carve-out dummy  -0.1180  0.4955  -0.0431  0.9036 
Historical market return  0.2680  0.4174  -0.0332  0.9444 
Historical lPO volume  -1.3491  0.2485  -3.2332  0.0837 
Number of  observations  95  61 
Adjusted R2  37.85%  39.30% 
PANEL B: DETERMINANTS OF THE SIZE OF THE SECONDARY PORTION 
TOTAL SAMPLE  OFFERINGS WITH A 
SECONDARY PORTION 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept  -0.4830  0.1502  -0.1536  0.7255 
Internal cash flow generation  0.3308  0.0002  0.2520  0.0240 
Leverage  0.0483  0.3513  0.0436  0.5640 
Firm age  0.0072  0.5573  0.0072  0.6535 
Firm size  0.0494  0.0022  0.0394  0.0462 
Carve-out dummy  0.1319  0.0017  0.0981  0.0294 
Ownership concentration  0.0064  0.0648  0.0046  0.2852 
Ownership concentration * Firm size  -0.0005  0.0007  -0.0005  0.0110 
Historical market return  0.0629  0.4312  0.0454  0.6484 
Historical lPO volume  -0.4706  0.0791  -0.4408  0.1788 
Number of observations  95  71 
AdjustedR2  34.71%  22.23% 
38 Table 6: 2SLS regression results: detenninants of the size of the primary, respectively secondary 
portion (N = 95) 
The dependent variable in column one (two), i.e. primary (secondary) portion, is the ratio of new (existing) shares sold to 
the public relative to  shares outstanding before the IPO.  Growth opportunities are measured by the market-to-book ratio. 
Capital expenditures  is  the ratio of capital expenditures  prior to  the IPO relative to  property,  plant and  equipment.  To 
measure internal cash flow generation, EBITD/total assets is used.  Leverage is debt to total assets.  Debt mix is the ratio of 
bank loans to total debt.  Firm age (size) is measured by the logarithm of firm age (total assets) at the IPO.  The carve-out 
dummy is set to one when the offering is a carve-out and zero otherwise.  Historical market return is the stock market return 
(BASI) in the year preceding the IPO, whereas historical IPO volume is the number ofIPOs in the preceding year scaled by 
the total number of offerings in  the sample.  Ownership concentration measures the percentage of shares that initial block 
holders own before the IPO. 
PRIMARY PORTION  SECONDARY PORTION 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept  2.6686  0.0088  0.0707  0.8668 
Growth opportunities  0.0394  0.0102  0 
Capital expenditures  0.1724  0.0378  0 
Internal cash flow generation  -1.4837  0.0007  0.1344  0.2326 
Leverage  -0.1760  0.4151  0.0326  0.5275 
Debt mix  0.5739  0.0154  0 
Firm age  -0.1245  0.0289  -0.0132  0.4284 
Firm size  -0.0933  0.0385  0.0322  0.0747 
Carve-out dummy  -0.1255  0.5500  0.1144  0.0067 
Ownership concentration  0  0.0051  0.1470 
Ownership concentration *  Firm size  0  -0.0005  0.0023 
Historical market return  0.2712  0.4202  0.0881  0.2808 
Historical IPO volume  -1.3400  0.2583  -0.5816  0.0340 
Primary portion  0  -0.1318  0.0187 
Secondary portion  0.0576  0.9493  0 
AdjustedR2  37.04%  34.22% 
39 Table 7: logit regression results: determinants of the likelihood of an institutional stake 
The dependent  variable  institutional portion dummy equals  one when  a fraction  of the shares  sold  is  pre-allocated  to 
institutional  investors  and  zero  otherwise.  Growth  opportunities  are  measured  by the  market-to-book  ratio.  Capital 
expenditures is  the ratio  of capital expenditures prior to  the IPO relative to  property, plant and equipment.  To  measure 
internal cash flow generation, EBITD/totai assets is used.  Leverage is debt to total assets.  Total funds collected is the log of 
the total number of shares placed in public times the offer price.  To take the endogenous nature of total funds collected into 
account, this variable is instrumented on the variables that determine the size of the primary and secondary portion.  Firm 
age (size) is measured by the logarithm of fIrm age (total assets) at the IPO.  The carve-out dummy is set to one when the 
offering is a carve-out and zero otherwise.  Historical market return is the stock market return (BASI) in the year preceding 
the IPO, whereas historical IPO volume is the number of IPOs in the preceding year scaled by the total number of offerings 
in the sample.  In column one, the model is estimated using the full sample and a dummy variable that equals one when the 
offering contains a primary portion is added.  In column two, the model is estimated using the offerings with a primary 
portion and a dummy variable that equals one when the offering is a combined offering is added. 
TOTAL SAMPLE  OFFERINGS WITH A 
PRIMARY PORTION 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept  -31.8021  0.0042  -37.3885  0.0249 
Growth opportunities  0.0100  0.9000  -0.0490  0.6568 
Capital expenditures  -0.4335  0.2944  -0.9814  0.1703 
Internal cash flow generation  0.5195  0.7874  0.4097  0.8792 
Leverage  -0.3142  0.7836  1.0086  0.5705 
Total funds collected (log) - instrumented  1.8311  0.0089  2.2898  0.0373 
Firm age  -0.0475  0.8820  -1.0316  0.0641 
Firm size  -0.3340  0.1972  -0.3307  0.3422 
Carve-out dummy  -0.7326  0.4238  0.5889  0.7097 
Historical market return  0.4038  0.8060  -3.2556  0.2127 
Historical IPO volume  13.2244  0.0454  20.4110  0.0276 
Primary portion dummy  1.7649  0.0537 
Combined offering dummy  0.4563  0.6891 
Number of  observations  95  71 
Log-likelihood  -37.6545  -20.4805 
AlC  107.3090  72.9610 
Pseudo-R2  56.50%  66.27% 
40 Table 8: OLS regression results: determinants of one- and two-year post-IPO market liquidity 
The  dependent  variable  one- (two-)  year  market  liquidity in column one  (two)  is  the  number  of shares  traded  over a 
window of one (two) year(s) following the lPO divided by the number of shares outstanding post-lPO.  The institutional 
portion dummy equals one when a fraction of the shares sold is pre-allocated to institutional investors and zero otherwise. 
Total funds collected is the log of the total number of shares placed in public times the offer price.  Growth opportunities 
are measured by the market-to-book ratio.  Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures prior to the lPO relative 
to property, plant and  equipment.  Firm age (size) is measured by the logarithm of firm age  at the lPO (total assets post-
lPO).  Market is equal to one if the firm lists on a market for innovative growth firms and zero otherwise.  Market maker 
equals one if at least one market maker is  appointed and is  zero otherwise.  Historical market return is the stock market 
return (BASI) in the year preceding the lPO, whereas historical lPO volume is the number of lPOs in the preceding year 
scaled by the total number of offerings in the sample. 
ONE-YEAR MARKET  TWO-YEAR MARKET 
LIQUIDITY  LIQUIDITY 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept  0.0410  0.9335  -0.4417  0.1208 
Institutional portion dummy  0.1488  0.0894  0.1145  0.0291 
Total funds collected (log)  0.0744  0.0200  0.0413  0.0181 
Growth opportunities  0.0019  0.845Q  -0.0003  0.9545 
Capital expenditures  -0.0411  0.2993  -0.0080  0.7057 
Firm age  -0.0293  0.3106  0.0119  0.4605 
Firm size post-lPO  -0.0564  0.0112  -0.0125  0.2974 
Market  0.2797  0.0269  0.2069  0.0042 
Market maker  0.0552  0.5082  0.0955  0.0533 
Historical market return  0.4927  0.0036  0.2038  0.0366 
Historical lPO volume  -0.7328  0.2705  -1.3337  0.0004 
Number of  observations  92  77 
Adjusted R2  37.67%  52.02% 
41 Table 9:  logit regression results: determinants of the likelihood of a seasoned equity offering within 
three years following the IPO 
The dependent variable seasoned equity offering dummy equals one when the firm issues seasoned equity within three years 
following  the  IPO  and  zero  otherwise.  Growth  opportunities  are  measured  by  the  market-to-book  ratio.  Capital 
expenditures is  the ratio of capital expenditures prior to  the  IPO relative to  property, plant and  equipment.  To  measure 
internal cash flow  generation, EBITDltotal assets is  used.  Leverage is  debt to total assets, measured post-IPo.  Firm age 
(size) is measured by the logarithm of firm age (total assets post-IPO).  Primary funds collected is the log of the number of 
primary shares  times  the  offer price.  Unexplained underpricing  is  the residual of the regression of underpricing on the 
adjustment in the offer price, market-to-book ratio, firm age, firm size, a dummy that equals one if a high-reputation foreign 
investment bank is part of the underwriting committee, the historical market return and the measure for hot versus cold issue 
markets.  Percentage adjustment in the offer price is  measured relative to  the  mid-price of the  initial price range.  The 
cumulative return on the firm's equity, respectively the stock market are both measured in the year following the IPO.  In 
column one, the model is estimated using the full sample and a dummy variable that equals one when the offering contains a 
primary portion is  added.  In column two,  the model is  estimated using the offerings with a primary portion and a dummy 
variable that equals one when the offering is a combined offering is added. 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept  -2.1242  0.6426 
Growth opportunities  0.0286  0.7272 
Capital expenditures  -0.3976  0.3355 
Internal cash flow generation  0.4222  0.7857 
Leverage post  -IPO  2.7564  0.0582 
Firm age  -0.4291  0.1396 
Firm size post-IPO  -0.0546  0.7430 
Primary funds collected (log)  -1.6085  0.0276 
Unexplained underpricing  0.9909  0.5460 
%Adjustment in offer price  -2.4950  0.4863 
Firm return on equity post-IPO  1.5213  0.0142 
Market return post-IPO  0.6574  0.6869 
Primary portion dummy  2.5348  0.0064 
Combined offering dummy 
Number of observations  95 
Log-likelihood  -37.4290 
AlC  108.8580 
Pseudo-R2  34.89% 
OFFERINGS WITH A 
PRIMARY PORTION 
Parameter estimate  p-value 
5.5131  0.4178 
-0.0502  0.6458 
-0.8376  0.2362 
-0.6499  0.7602 
2.5428  0.2894 
-1.0830  0.0709 
-0.1731  0.4620 
-2.5544  0.0303 
-0.4955  0.8098 
-6.3394  0.1979 
2.0421  0.0168 
0.9509  0.6691 





42 Table 10: logit regression results: determinants of the likelihood of a takeover within five years 
following the !PO 
The dependent variable takeover dummy equals one when the firm is taken over within five years following its IPO and 
zero  otherwise.  Growth  opportunities  are  measured  by  the  market-to-book  ratio.  To  measure  internal  cash  flow 
generation, EBITD/total assets is used.  Leverage is debt to total assets, measured post-IPo.  Firm age (size) is measured 
by  the logarithm of firm  age (total assets post-IPO).  The cumulative return on the firm's equity, respectively the stock 
market are both measured in the year following the IPO.  Finally, a dummy variable that equals one when the offering is a 
secondary one is added. 
Variable  Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept  -8.4254  0.1123 
Growth opportunities  -0.0399  0.8032 
Internal cash flow generation  -1.3138  0.6303 
Leverage post  -IPO  -2.5515  0.0922 
Firm age  0.1320  0.6189 
Firm size post-IPO  0.3022  0.1514 
Firm return on equity post-IPO  -2.2675  0.0880 
Market return post-IPO  1.1907  0.6028 
Secondary offering dummy  1.7743  0.0742 
Number of observations  95 
Log-likelihood  -25.5955 
AlC  69.191 
Pseudo-R2  23.71% 
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